Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts

By B. Douglas Bernheim, B. Peleg, M. Whinston. 1987

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The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

1. Chao Yu
2. A. Alesina
3. Zhen-Yu Tang
4. Enrico Spolaore
5. Mark L. J. Wright
6. Yu Wang
7. Xiaolong Wang
8. Huazhe Xu

Citations in the corpus

• Discovering Diverse Multi-Agent Strategic Behavior via Reward Randomization (2021, background): “…a subset of equilibria satisfying desirable properties, e.g., admissibility (Banks & Sobel, 1987), subgame perfection (Selten, 1965), Pareto efficiency (Bernheim et al., 1987) or robustness against opponent’s deviation from best response in security-related applications (Fang et al., 2013; An et…”
• War, Peace and the Size of Countries (2005, methodology): “When multiple equilibria exist, we will select (perfectly) coalition-proof Nash equilibria, as defined in Bernheim et al. (1987).(30) Our game has a unique (perfectly) coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, which can be derived as follows.”
• Endogenous cartel formation with heterogeneous firms (2008, background): “By (1), we need the smallest …rm in the cartel to be su¢ ciently large; and, by (2), we need the largest …rm outside of the cartel to be su¢ ciently small.”
• Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter (2000, background): “In Bulow and Rogoff [1989b], Atkeson [1991] and other models, ‘‘lenders’’ offer insurance contracts that require the external enforcement of explicit state-contingent payments.”
• Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy † (2015, background): “The concept is widely used in different fields and was originally called strong equilibrium in Aumann (1959); also see Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987).”
• Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion (2009, unknown): “See online Appendix D for tables and figures giving frequencies of all actions in both periods for all rounds, broken down by treatment.”