Resolution of corporate distress in East Asia

By Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, L. Klapper. 2003

197 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/60becccfb6ad3c6b30109ca515ab064540d9069a

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Citations in the corpus

A real-valued genetic algorithm to optimize the parameters of support vector machine for predicting bankruptcy (2007, background): “The financial crisis in East Asia provoked particularly extensive studies of the financial distress of institutions with various financial and ownership structures that arose across countries with very diverse institutional setups in East Asia in 1997 and 1998 ( Claessens, Djankov, & Klapper, 2003 )”
Estimating financial distress likelihood (2008, background): “Creditors typically rely on measures of profitability when extending credit or renegotiating repayments to estimate the return generated by the firm on borrowed capital (Claessens et al., 2003).”
Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship Development: A Real Options Perspective (2007, background): “This is important, because the same entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law may have different implications for firms in different environments ( Claessens, Djankov, & Klapper, 2002 ).”
Emerging Markets Finance (2003, background): “Claessens et al. (2003) examine the incidence of bankruptcy filings during the Asian crisis.”
Institutions, ownership structures, and distress resolution in China☆ (2013, background): “These findings complement previous studies on the relationship between institutions and finance (Acharya et al., 2011; Claessens and Klapper, 2005; Claessens et al., 2003; Dahiya and Klapper, 2007; Djankov et al., 2008).”
Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding (2009, background): “Legal protection against self-dealing In the Asian context, where so many firms have dominant owners (Claessens, Djankov, & Klapper, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999), minority shareholders have every reason to be more concerned about expropriation by larger shareholders than about the detrimental…”
How Bank Market Concentration, Regulation, and Institutions Shape the Real Effects of Banking Crises (2010, background): “Claessens et al. (2003) find that generous support for banking systems does not reduce the output cost of banking crises.”