Determinants of CEO Pay: A Comparison of ExecuComp and Non-ExecuComp Firms

By Brian D. Cadman, Sandy Klasa, Steven R. Matsunaga. 2010

110 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5fb21d825959fabaab24b90cff0f91868c82c1bc

Citations in the corpus

• Executive Overconfidence and Compensation Structure (2015, unknown): “For example, Cadman et al. (2010) find incentive compensation decreases”
• The Role of Managerial Ability in Corporate Tax Avoidance (2017, unknown): “Prior research shows that Execucomp firms differ from the Compustat population along a variety of dimensions (e.g., Cadman et al. 2010), and imposing further restrictions on this sample reduces the power of our tests.”
• CEO After-Tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance (2014, unknown): “…firms employ after-tax incentives in CEO compensation, I begin by considering the sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to accounting earnings, consistent with prior studies documenting a positive association between cash compensation and accounting income (e.g., Sloan 1993, Cadman et al. 2010).”