CEO After-Tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance
By Fabio B. Gaertner. 2014
241 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b416a46ae7b0c027467b3e9a741a7230c1caea5b
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In Accounting
- Liang Tan
- James N. Myers
- Suraj Srinivasan
- Linda A. Myers
- Michael S. Drake
- T. Atwood
- Mozaffar Khan
- Valeri V. Nikolaev
In Economics and Econometrics
Citations in the corpus
- Home Country Tax System Characteristics and Corporate Tax Avoidance: International Evidence (2012, background): “…we include the home-country statutory tax rate as a control variable.19 With respect to the other country-level control variables, prior research provides evidence that management incentives impact tax avoidance (Phillips 2003; Rego and Wilson 2008; Hanlon and Heitzman 2009; Gaertner 2010).”
- The Role of Managerial Ability in Corporate Tax Avoidance (2017, unknown): “Prior research also shows that executive compensation incentives influence corporate tax avoidance policies (e.g., Rego and Wilson 2012, Armstrong et al. 2012, Gaertner 2014).”
- Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: New Evidence (2017, background): “Tax avoidance increases after-tax income, and CEOs are reported in Graham et al. (2014) to believe that it can be used to increase earnings per share (EPS).”