Is the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme Hazardous for Banks or Helpful to Small Business?

By Marc Cowling, P. Mitchell. 2003

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NO DEEP POCKETS: SOME STYLIZED EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON FIRMS' FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS (2010, unknown): “Additionally, Cowling and Mitchell (2003), for the UK (1984–1998), find that failure is related to the cost of capital, with higher severity for smaller firms.”
The impact of government financial support on the performance of new firms: the role of competitive advantage as an intermediate outcome (2014, background): “…public policies affect the number of new firms/new jobs created in a country or across countries), or a firm-level of analysis (e.g. Cowling 2010; Cowling and Mitchell 2003; Lenihan and Hart 2006; Mole et al. 2009, 2011; Morris and Stevens 2010; Oh et al. 2009; Rotger, Gørtz, and Storey 2012),…”
The latent demand for bank debt: characterizing “discouraged borrowers” (2012, result): “This is echoed in more recent work on the UK Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme. Cowling and Mitchell (2003, p. 67) :”
Incrementality of SME Loan Guarantees (2007, background): “expansion of the volume of lending to SMEs (Cowling and Mitchell, 2003), 2.”