The Inflation Bias When the Central Bank Targets, the Natural Rate of Unemployment

By Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia. 2004

135 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5ea11efe71592f08c6a3444aa5cacb253ac03c66

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Are monetary-policy reaction functions asymmetric?: The role of nonlinearity in the Phillips curve (2005, background): “More recently, Orphanides and Wieland (2000), Ruge-Murcia (2002), Dolado et al. (2002), Surico (2002) and Cukierman and Muscatelli (2002) have analysed the implications for the derivation of interest-rate reaction functions of assuming asymmetric preferences with respect to in5ation and/or output…”
Does the Barro-Gordon Model Explain the Behavior of US Inflation? a Reexamination of the Empirical Evidence (2003, methodology): “Ruge-Murcia (2001) examines empirically this proposition using data from six developed economies and a specification of preferences where the central banker can attach a larger weight to positive than negative unemployment deviations from the natural rate.”
Inflation Targeting under Asymmetric Preferences (2001, methodology): “Ruge-Murcia (2001c) examines this prediction using cross-section data from 21 OECD countries.”
Nonlinear Monetary Policy Rules: Some New Evidence for the U.S. (2002, background): “it = a+ ρ(L)it−1 + (1− ρ)(byt + cπt + dσ(2) π,t + ηxt) + ξt, (20)”
Interest Rate Setting and Inflation Targeting: Evidence of a Nonlinear Taylor Rule for the United Kingdom (2006, unknown): “In other research, the increased sensitivity of the central bank to negative output gaps along in the presence of uncertainty regarding the state of the economy is considered by Cukierman (2000) and Ruge-Murcia (2003) to be the driving forces of inflation bias.”
The Inflation Bias Revisited: Theory and Some International Evidence (2003, background): “and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1995) suggest optimal incentive contracts for central bankers and Svensson (1997a) shows that, in some cases, such optimal contracts can be implemented by means of a simple inflation target.”
Are Contemporary Central Banks Transparent About Economic Models and Objectives and What Difference Does it Make? (2002, background): “The view, currently held by some European central banks, that current monetary policy can affect inflation only in the second year after the implementation of the policy may be thought of as such a built in institutional hedging device mainly against unexpected recessions. This device builds in a ”f”
VOLATILITY AND CORRELATION FORECASTING (2006, background): “In a more recent study, Ruge-Murcia (2004) developed a model of a central bank with asymmetric preferences for unemployment above versus below the natural rate.”