Inflation Targeting under Asymmetric Preferences

By Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia. Social Science Research Network, 2001

192 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. Specifically, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to this generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the UK are statistically different from the one implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/66ce0c608a8243cb727e17e20192fbbb7adb68eb

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In Economics and Econometrics

  1. Tim Bollerslev
  2. Torben G. Andersen
  3. Andrew J. Patton
  4. Peter F. Christoffersen
  5. Francis X. Diebold
  6. Kevin Sheppard
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  8. George Tauchen

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