The Inflation Bias Revisited: Theory and Some International Evidence

By A. Cukierman, Stefan Gerlach. 2003

190 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b5cc498c1e81870565c1394e2dbc4b6a75386859

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Menelaos Karanasos
2. Stilianos Fountas
3. Jan-Egbert Sturm
4. Jakob de Haan
5. Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche
6. A. Cukierman
7. Jinki Kim
8. Helge Berger

In Finance

1. Stilianos Fountas
2. Menelaos Karanasos
3. Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche
4. A. Cukierman
5. Jan-Egbert Sturm
6. Jakob de Haan
7. Helge Berger
8. Jinki Kim

Citations in the corpus

• Inflation Uncertainty, Output Growth Uncertainty and Macroeconomic Performance (2006, background): “3The prediction of Devereux’s theory regarding the positive causal effect of output uncertainty on the inflation rate is borne out also in a recent paper by Cukierman and Gerlach (2003).”
• Estimating Central Banks' preferences from a time-varying empirical reaction function (2006, methodology): “2Modelling the relation between inflation and unemployment (Ruge-Murcia, 2001) or the coefficients in a Taylor rule (Cukierman and Gerlach, 2003) with a non-linear function is an alternative to the approach pursued in this paper.”
• Does Money Matter in the ECB Strategy? New Evidence Based on ECB Communication (2006, background): “12 See Aguiar and Martins (2005), Ruge-Murcia (2003a,b) and Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) for empirical tests.”
• The Limits of Transparency (2011, background): “Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) test this implication empirically in a cross-section of OECD countries and find support for it.”
• Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions - Past Present and Future (2008, background): “Using cross-sectional data from industrial economies Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) fi nd support for this theory.”
• Inflation, output growth, and nominal and real uncertainty: Empirical evidence for the G7 (2007, background): “…uncertainty Granger-causes inflation Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) þ Holland (1995) (4) Output uncertainty Granger-causes inflation Devereux (1989), Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) þ Taylor effect and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) (5) Output uncertainty Granger-causes output growth Business…”
• Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness (2008, unknown): “The rationale for delegation can then be motivated by other concerns, including political economy factors (Crowe, 2006a; Cukierman and Gerlach, 2003; Goodman, 1991; Hayo, 1998; Lohmann, 1998).”
• The Fed's monetary policy rule and U.S. inflation: The case of asymmetric preferences (2007, unknown): “Ruge-Murcia (2003) and Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) adopt an inflation rate reaction function that is nonlinear in either inflation or the output gap, and they favor the hypothesis of an asymmetric objective for some OECD economies.”