Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from Western European Corporations

By Benjamin Maury. 2006

1,146 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5e36d1040d829599c3d165dc8708ecb140df42d0

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Citations in the corpus

Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and implied cost of equity (2008, background): “Nevertheless, Anderson et al.’s (2003) evidence is likely to be most tenable in the U.S. Barontini and Caprio (2005) and Maury (2006) find that family control is better than other types of control for firm value and operating performance in European firms.”
Ownership structure, control contestability, and corporate debt maturity (2015, background): “…studies have examined the extent of minority shareholders’ expropriation by studying the effect of the control–ownership wedge of the largest owner on firm valuation (Claessens et al., 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Maury, 2006; Attig et al., 2009, and many others).”
Stewardship or Agency? A Social Embeddedness Reconciliation of Conduct and Performance in Public Family Businesses (2011, background): “Thus our models control for firm age, the natural log of sales, industry membership at the 2-digit SIC level, and the beta measure of market volatility (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Maury, 2006).”
Ownership versus Management Effects on Performance in Family and Founder Companies: A Bayesian Reconciliation (2011, neutral): “…on family firm performance has been rife with disagreements, with some studies finding family firms to outperform (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006; McConaughy, Walker, Henderson, & Mishra, 1998; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Weber, Lavelle, Lowry, Zellner, & Barrett, 2003), other studies…”
Firm Philanthropy in Small- and Medium-Sized Family Firms (2014, positive): “To operationalize family involvement in management, we adopted the ratio between the number of family members serving as managers and the number of family members working in the firm (see Maury, 2006).”
Ownership structure, corporate governance and corporate performance in Malaysia (2010, background): “It has been suggested that agency problems between principals and agents may be less prevalent in smaller and closely held companies (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Maury, 2006).”
Family Ownership and Control, the Presence of Other Large Shareholders, and Firm Performance: Further Evidence (2011, methodology): “Empirical evidence from Western Europe, Nuevas.”
Assessing France's Joint Audit Requirement: Are Two Heads Better than One? (2006, background): “companies, and larger ownership by groups such as families that have a close relationship with the company (Thomsen, Pedersen and Kvist 2006; Roosenboom and Schramade 2006; Maury 2006; Morck 2005; Grier and Zychowicz 1994).”
Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone (2011, positive): “15 nonlinearly on firm value and profitability due to the monitoring and expropriation hypotheses, increasing corporate performance first as family ownership concentration rises and then decreasing after a certain level of ownership owned by the family (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006).”
Influence of Family Involvement in Management and Ownership on Firm Performance: Evidence From Poland (2010, result): “A number of previous studies have shown a positive and significant effect of family involvement in ownership (FIO) or management (FIM) on financial performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006).”
Family Firm Research – A Review (2014, positive): “This finding is confirmed by later studies (e.g., Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Maury, 2006; Andres, 2008) and suggests that family ownership is an effective organizational structure.”
CEO Compensation in Private Family Firms (2013, methodology): “We added “leverage” as an instrument because leverage is often indicated to as an important determinant of ROA (Campello, 2006; Maury, 2006).”