Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation
By Andrés Almazán, Jay C. Hartzell, Laura T. Starks. 2005
669 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5bed40b7c6cef629137a820f21e5c44d2feb3f95
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In Accounting
- Elyas Elyasiani
- Jingyi Jia
- Jarrad Harford
- Pedro Matos
- Xiaohua Fang
- Jeffrey L. Callen
- Miguel A. Ferreira
- Brian L. Connelly
In Finance
- Elyas Elyasiani
- Jingyi Jia
- Xiaohua Fang
- Jeffrey L. Callen
- Kai Li
- Jarrad Harford
- Chris Brooks
- Zhong Chen
Citations in the corpus
- Distribution of institutional ownership and corporate firm performance (2010, background): “, 1988; Del Guercio, 1996; Almazan et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007; and Cornett et al., 2007). These groups include: pressure-insensitive (public pension funds, mutual funds), pressure-sensitive (insurers, banks, and nonblank trusts owning at least one percent of the firm’s stock), and pressure-inde”
- Variation in the Monitoring Incentives of Outside Stockholders* (2006, background): “2 See Huson (1997), Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998), and Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) for evidence that institutional investors have influenced operating decisions; and Smith (1996), Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996), and Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) for evidence on the impact…”
- Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter? (2007, methodology): “…of our results are qualitatively unchanged if we use either of the other two measures.2 Following Brickley et al. (1988), Cornett et al. (2004) and Almazan et al. (2005), we refine the CDA/Spectrum institutional classification into two groups according to the institution’s potential business ties…”
- Institutional Cross-Ownership and Corporate Strategy: The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions (2018, positive): “These results are consistent with Almazan et al. (2005) and Chen et al. (2007) that independent institutional investors are more likely to play a monitoring role in corporate governance. We also follow Bushee (1998) and Bushee and Noe (2000) to classify institutional crossowners into: non-transient ”
- The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional investors around the world (2008, positive): “Following Brickley et al. (1988), Almazan et al. (2005), and Chen et al. (2006), we divide institutions into two groups: independent institutions (mutual fund managers and investment advisers) and grey institutions (bank trusts, insurance companies, and other institutions).”