Checking Before Output May Not Be Enough Against Fault-Based Cryptanalysis

By Sung-Ming Yen, Marc Joye. IEEE Trans. Computers, 2000

412 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Fault Injection Attacks on Cryptographic Devices: Theory, Practice, and Countermeasures (2012, methodology): “An example of applying the technique proposed by Bao [6] that is worth mentioning is the one reported in [50].”
Fault Attacks on RSA with CRT: Concrete Results and Practical Countermeasures (2002, background): “For instance a series of papers [ YJ ,YKLM1,YKLM2,JQYY] assume that the attacker has a very precise knowledge about the implementation details and especially an absolute accurate control of the timing of his fault induction.”
Side-Channel Attacks: Ten Years After Its Publication and the Impacts on Cryptographic Module Security Testing (2005, background): “[96] showed that checking the correctness of the computed result before giving it to others may not be enough to prevent a hardware fault-based cryptanalysis.”
Fault Based Cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (2003, methodology): “Finally we would like to note that recently the table based approach for xtime was also shown to be susceptible to a Differential Power Analysis by [ YJ ].”
Raccoon: Closing Digital Side-Channels through Obfuscated Execution (2015, background): “Some application-level information leaks are beyond the application’s control, for example, an adversary reading a victim’s secrets through the /proc ﬁlesystem [13], or a victim’s ﬂoating point registers that are not cleared on a context switch [2].”