Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device
By Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter, Georg Kirchsteiger. 2001
509 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5b4ffbeff3d4ff38b57a0d108b7bd9aa4da2c553
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Ernst Fehr
- David J. Cooper
- John H. Kagel
- Matthias Sutter
- James C. Cox
- Vladas Griskevicius
- Stefan T. Trautmann
- Gary Charness
Citations in the corpus
- Fairness and contract design (2007, background): “Previous work by Camerer and Weigelt (1988); Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993); Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995); Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997); Hannan, Kagel and Moser (2002); and Charness (2004) indicated that fairness concerns may play an important role in moral hazard contexts.”
- Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students (2004, unknown): “Schotter and Weigelt, 1987; Fehr, Gachter and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Guth, Konigstein,”
- Other Regarding Preferences: A Selective Survey of Experimental Results (2012, background): “Models of 77 Among others see Fehr, Gachter, and Kirchsteiger (1997), Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (2011), Ploner and Ziegelmeyer (2008), Kessler and Leider (2012).”
- Gender Differences in Trust and Reciprocity (2003, background): “For an overview of evidence and an excellent discussion of reciprocal motivations, see Fehr and Gächter (2000). See Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Falk and Fischbacher(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) for theoretical models of trusting and reciprocal behavior.”
- ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition (2000, background): “Appendix for Fehr et al.'s whole cost function), ′ ≥ ′′ ≥ c e c e ( ) , ( ) 0 0 . The data analysis, however, accounts for the discontinuities in the experiment’s strategy spaces. The Fehr et al. design involved an excess supply curve, but Charness (1996) replicated the experiment without one, and s”
- A controlled field experiment on corruption (2011, background): “4% of the subjects in Frank and Schulze (2000) acted honestly even though corruption had a negative externality on an actual public entity (i.”