Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure

By L. Lowenstein. 1996

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Citations in the corpus

Challenges for Transparency (2017, background): “The case for transparency has been made in many settings, including for government policy (Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 2001), business (Lowenstein, 1996), charity (Sridhar and Batniji, 2008), and algorithms (Mortier et al.”
Performing finance: the industry, the media and its image (2004, background): “Added to this, however, the corporate sector is increasingly active in ‘managing’ financial news including reported earnings and assets and liabilities (Lowenstein, 1996).”
Transparency: Motivations and Challenges (2017, background): “ess and trust. Keywords: transparency interpretability explainable social good. 1 Introduction The case for transparency has been made in many settings, including for government policy [69], business [44], charity [63], and algorithms [48]. Within machine learning, there is a general feeling that \t”
Measuring corporate environmental performance: the trade-offs of sustainability ratings (2010, background): “Lowenstein (1996) argues that the openness about the way fi rms operate in the United States makes the American industry more effi cient and competitive.”
Impact of firm performance expectations on CEO turnover and replacement decisions (2003, unknown): “This is consistent with the argument that analysts and other commentators have forced corporate boards to become more active and independent to avoid the potential for adverse publicity and a resulting decline in firm value (Lowenstein, 1996) and Lowenstein, 1999).”
Monitoring by the financial press and forced CEO turnover (2002, background): “First, Lowenstein (1996, 1999) argues that the media influences corporate boards to be more effective because it creates fear that shareholders will sell their shares in response to negative press coverage.”
Corporate Governance and Equity Liquidity: Analysis of S&P Transparency and Disclosure Rankings (2007, background): “Lowenstein (1996), for example, argued that good disclosure is an extremely efficient and effective mechanism for ensuring that managers perform better; this implies that firms with better information disclosure may achieve better corporate governance.”
Corporate Governance and Institutional Transparency in Emerging Markets (2005, unknown): “The traditional market-based corporate governance models focus on the financial practices that aim at governing corporate performance (American Law Institute, 1982, 1990; Cadbury, 1993; Charkham, 1989; Hart, 1995; Kay and Silberston, 1995; Lowenstein, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Williamson, 198”
Why Should They Care? The Role of Institutional Investors in the Market for Corporate Global Responsibility (2005, background): “Consistent with Lowenstein (1996), it is assumed that managers manage what is measured; that is, the objective function of the firm combines a concern for both variables.”