Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets

By Michael R. Baye, John Morgan. 2001

694 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Media Technology, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/54d201aa908453675c18145c1d34be077205bd95

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Citations in the corpus

Competition for attention in the Information (overload) Age (2012, background): “Indeed, both sides can be active, as in Baye and Morgan (2001).”
An Empirical Analysis of Search Engine Advertising: Sponsored Search in Electronic Markets (2009, neutral): “…also related to other forms of paid placements available to retailers on the internet available such as sponsored listings on shopping bots (e.g., Baye and Morgan 2001, Baye et al. 2008) who have studied the role of shopping bots as information gate keepers and estimated the impact of retailers’…”
Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation (2015, background): “Baye and Morgan (2001) and Galeotti and Moraga-González (2009) allow buyers to bypass the platform, but they assume the platform is essential for buyers to be able to choose between sellers: In their models, a buyer who bypasses the platform has no way to access competing sellers and thus faces a…”
Information, Search, and Price Dispersion (2006, background): “Baye and Morgan (2001) point out that, in practice, it is generally costly for rms to 27 advertise their prices and for consumers to gain access to the list of prices posted at the clearinghouse.”
The Strategic Role of Third‐Party Marketplaces in Retailing (2014, neutral): “Price dispersion has been studied extensively in the literature and theories (such as Baye and Morgan 2001, Varian 1980) have been developed to explain the existence of price dispersion (e.g., through search frictions, switching costs, and heterogeneous demand).”
Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermediation Service Providers (2003, background): “10 There are also pecuniary externalities between participants on the same side of the market that can be negative (see Baye and Morgan, 2001) but also positive, for instance for demand aggregators such as mobshop.com.”
Strategic Price Complexity in Retail Financial Markets (2009, background): “ngton University in irregularities have been documented empirically in the markets for S&P Index funds (Hortacsu and Syverson, 2004), money market funds (Christoffersen and Musto, 2002), mutual funds (Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano, 2007), retail municipal bonds (Green, Hollifield, and Schürhoff”
Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search and the Number of Firms (2004, background): “Recently, Baye and Morgan (2001) have studied an oligopolistic search model to analyse the effects of information intermediation on the Internet.”
Price Dispersion in the Small and in the Large: Evidence from an Internet Price Comparison Site (2004, neutral): “[2] Baye, M.”
Does Digital Divide or Provide? The Impact of Cell Phones on Grain Markets in Niger (2008, background): “j j dm dr dE N dE N dc dm dr dc   (6)”
Middlemen versus Market Makers: A Theory of Competitive Exchange (2002, background): “The Bellman equation for the producer is given by Vp(b;v) = max"0;b v;ρ(1 λ)Z b b Vp(b0;v)Fβ(db0)# ; (4) where[b;b℄ is the support of the distribution of bid prices offered by middlemen.”
Why do intermediaries divert search (2009, background): “If it does not hold then the same result holds for any continuous selection of stable fixed points of (4).”
An empirical model of search with vertically differentiated products (2011, background): “First, a large theoretical literature on consumer search behavior (e.g. Reinganum, 1979; Burdett and Judd, 1983; Stahl, 1989; Baye and Morgan, 2001; Janssen and Moraga-González, 2004) has shown that imperfect information about sellers’ prices may lead to equilibrium price dispersion, even when produ”