Why does the Cognitive Reflection Test (sometimes) predict utilitarian moral judgment (and other things)

By J. Baron, Sydney E. Scott, Katrina M. Fincher, Sarah Emlen Metz. 2015

311 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Information Systems and Management, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/063e96102236ec39660583dd6b0e2c2a2f126cc9

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Citations in the corpus

On the reception and detection of pseudo-profound bullshit (2015, unknown): “Meehl (1956) Baron, Scott, Fincher & Metz, 2014) results from a mindset that searches for information as a means to facilitate critical analysis and reﬂection.”
Investigating an alternate form of the cognitive reflection test (2016, methodology): “Baron et al. (2015) actually included belief bias items in their extended CRT measure, finding that the belief bias items predicted moral reasoning as well as other CRT items, in addition to having generally high correlations with the extended CRT measure.”
Reflective liberals and intuitive conservatives: A look at the Cognitive Reflection Test and ideology (2015, unknown): “…operate sequentially—i.e. where intuition is automatic and then regulated through reﬂection (Evans, 2003, 2007)—or in parallel with individuals differing in the degree to which intuition versus reﬂection are activated in the ﬁrst place (Baron et al., 2014; Sineyav & Peters 2015; Sloman 1996).”
Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices (2018, methodology): “…accuracy on cognitive reflection tasks (Frederick, 2005) has been widely used to classify individuals as “impulsive” or “reflective,” and more recently Baron et al. (2015) and Johnson, Tubau and De Neys (2016) show that across individuals on a given task, people who respond more quickly are less…”
On the belief that beliefs should change according to evidence: Implications for conspiratorial, moral, paranormal, political, religious, and science beliefs (2019, background): “Moreover, much like individual differences in cognitive reflection, high AOT has been linked to skepticism about supernatural claims (Baron et al., 2015; Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler & Fugelsang, 2014; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013) and superstition (Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999), indicating that…”
An examination of the underlying dimensional structure of three domains of contaminated mindware: paranormal beliefs, conspiracy beliefs, and anti-science attitudes (2020, unknown): “…to actively seek and consider several possible conclusions even if they contradict or challenge one ’ s initial or preferred conclusion and beliefs (Baron et al., 2015, 2016; Stanovich et al., 2016), has been shown to be negatively associated with anti-science attitudes, conspiracy beliefs, and…”
Political Ideology Predicts Perceptions of the Threat of COVID-19 (and Susceptibility to Fake News About It) (2020, background): “The CRT contained nine items (a ¼ .735) taken from several sources (Baron et al., 2015; Oldrati et al., 2016; Primi et al., 2016; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016; Toplak et al., 2014).”