On the ontological status of autism: the ‘double empathy problem’

By Damian Milton. 2012

1,599 citations recorded by the source corpus.

In recent decades there has been much debate over the ontological status of autism and other neurological ‘disorders’, diagnosed by behavioural indicators, and theorised primarily within the field of cognitive neuroscience and psychological paradigms. Such cognitive-behavioural discourses abstain from acknowledging the universal issue of relationality and interaction in the formation of a contested and constantly reconstructed social reality, produced through the agency of its ‘actors’. The nature of these contested interactions will be explored in this current issues piece through the use of the term the ‘double empathy problem’, and how such a rendition produces a critique of autism being defined as a deficit in ‘theory of mind’, re-framing such issues as a question of reciprocity and mutuality. In keeping with other autistic self-advocates, this piece will refer to ‘autistic people’, and ‘those who identify as on the autism spectrum’, rather than ‘people with autism’.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Developmental and Educational Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5153209695a70ac7c171050b0cba3dab1e0676ec

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In Cognitive Neuroscience

  1. S. Fletcher‐Watson
  2. Craig Goodall
  3. F. Happé
  4. T. Sims

In Developmental and Educational Psychology

  1. S. Fletcher‐Watson
  2. Craig Goodall
  3. F. Happé
  4. T. Sims

Citations in the corpus