The Mind Doesn't Work That Way : The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology

By Jerry A. Fodor. 2000

946 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4f563d7cb241b2142c1237adfbe41d0ac2747f0a

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In Cognitive Neuroscience

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

Citations in the corpus

The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents (2005, background): “…people advance and laboriously defend arguments whose obvious weakness they themselves would readily detect in other contexts (e.g., Chomsky, 1987; Fodor, 2000).3 The rationalizations for peripheralizing Darwinism have impeded the emergence of a critical mass of researchers who appreciate its…”
Adaptive rationality: An evolutionary perspective on cognitive bias (2009, neutral): “Fodor (2000), for example, recently declared, "there is nothing in the 'evolutionary,' or the 'bio logical,' or the 'scientific' worldview that shows, or even suggests, that the proper function of cognition is other than the fixation of true beliefs" (p. 68).”
Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds (2008, neutral): “Fodor (2000) has argued that this problem is unsolvable, and therefore that the human mind cannot, in the end, be entirely computational.”
Modularity in cognition: framing the debate. (2006, background): “Fodor (2000) gave a precise version of the shape of arguments for domaingeneral mechanisms, which tend to turn on the idea that at least some mechanisms must be more domain general than others.”
Acquisition by processing: A modular perspective on language development (2004, background): “There is considerable evidence that the mind is composed to a large extent of functionally specialized processors, or MODULES, though disagreement exists in many areas (see, for example, Fodor, 1983, 2000; Jackendoff, 1987, 1997, 1999, 2002; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).”
Evolutionary Psychology, Meet Developmental Neurobiology: Against Promiscuous Modularity (2000, background): “To put this another way, domain specificity and “innate” knowledge in themselves don’t necessitate modularity – that is, they don’t require separate, functionally specialized psychological mechanisms (see Samuels, 1998 and Fodor, 2000).”
STEVENS' HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (2002, neutral): “Gabrielsson, A. (1999). The performance of music.”