Platform competition: Strategic trade‐offs in platform markets

By Carmelo Cennamo, Juan Santaló. 2013

700 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Marketing, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4cc3d71f81c2b9604a7e2a0c3249618bf101db82

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Citations in the corpus

Optimal distinctiveness: Broadening the interface between institutional theory and strategic management (2017, background): “This is more likely the case in dynamic entrepreneurial markets such as video games that are subject to fads (Cennamo and Santalo, 2013).”
Unpaid Crowd Complementors: The Platform Network Effect Mirage (2015, neutral): “Research on network effects and platform strategy has largely conceptualized platforms as multi-sided markets in which producers of complementary goods (“complementors”) on one side compete to sell to users on the other side1 (e.g., Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Cennamo and Santaló, 2013; Parker and Van A”
Towards a theory of ecosystems (2018, positive): “Balancing the trade-offs involved in controlling the core technology is one of the main goals of platform ecosystem governance (Cennamo & Santaló, 2013; Cennamo, 2016; Wareham et al. , 2014), also identified as a key problem of organization design (Baldwin, 2008; 2012).”
Explaining the internationalization of ibusiness firms (2015, background): “In this kind of market late movers can make important inroads (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013; Eisenmann et al., 2006).”
Digital platform ecosystems (2019, background): “those against Microsoft and Google (Iacobucci and Ducci 2019; Schmalensee 2000) that show the relevance and importance of the so-called “winner-take-all” effect of two-sided markets (Cennamo and Santalo 2013).”
Discontinuities, competition, and cooperation: Coopetitive dynamics between incumbents and entrants (2018, background): “Technological competition for distributive platforms tend to follow a winner-take-all logic (Cennamo and Santalo, 2013).”
Platform Competition: A Systematic and Interdisciplinary Review of the Literature (2020, neutral): “While a growing body of work has highlighted conditions under which winner-takes-all dynamics occur in platform markets (e.g., Cennamo & Santalo, 2013; J. Chen, Doraszelski & Harrington, 2009; Dubé, Hitsch, & Chintagunta, 2010; Schilling, 2002), much less is known about how and why dominant…”