Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage

By T. Beard, D. Kaserman, J. Mayo. 2003

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Regulating Service Quality: A Survey (2005, background): “ Beard et al. (2001) , Mandy (2001), Weisman and Kang (2001), Foros et al. (2002), and Farrell (2003) among others, analyze the effect of wholesale service prices on incentives to raise rivals’ operating costs.”
Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks (2003, background): “A recent set of papers explicitly deals with the incentive of vertically integrated firms to use nonprice discrimination, called " sabotage, " to disadvantage downstream rivals that have to buy an essential upstream input from the incumbent (Weisman 1995, 1998; David Sibley and Dennis Weisman 1998a,”
Regulation, Competition and Liberalization (2005, background): “Weisman (1995), Economides (1998), Reiffen (1998), Mandy (2000), Beard et al. (2001), and Mandy and Sappington (2003), among others, analyze the incentives of a vertically-integrated supplier to disadvantage retail competitors.”
Strategic investments with spillovers, vertical integration and foreclosure in the broadband access market (2004, background): “Moreover, the investment and the rival’s quantity increase with the rival’s ability to use the quality improvement when b2 > b1; i.e. that dx*=db2 > 0 and dq2*=db2 > 0: Without access price regulation, the vertically integrated firm may imitate the strategy of the foreclosure case in the market…”