Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks
By Ingo Vogelsang. 2003
252 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Media Technology, Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5cdc604d7d441174c66f713364d9ddcbb04525fa
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Media Technology
- Gordon J. Klein
- Justus Haucap
- Pinar Dogan
- Marc Bourreau
- L. Röller
- Michal Grajek
- P. Joskow
- Ulrich Heimeshoff
In Political Science and International Relations
In Strategy and Management
- Gordon J. Klein
- Justus Haucap
- Pinar Dogan
- Marc Bourreau
- L. Röller
- Michal Grajek
- P. Joskow
- Ulrich Heimeshoff
Citations in the corpus
- Regulation of Natural Monopoly (2007, background): “…integrated firms in several regulated industries are “restructured” to separate natural monopoly network segments from competitive segments and price and entry regulation relaxed in the competitive segments [Vickers (1995), Laffont and Tirole (2000), Baumol and Sidak (1994), Vogelsang (2003)].”
- Regulation of Natural Monopolies (2005, unknown): “…integrated firms in several regulated industries are “restructured” to separate natural monopoly network segments from competitive 170 segments and price and entry regulation relaxed in the competitive segments (Vickers 1995; Laffont and Tirole 2000; Baumol and Sidak 1994; Vogelsang 2003).”
- Unbundling the local loop (2005, background): “Both these strands are thoroughly analyzed and discussed in Armstrong (2002); see also Laffont and Tirole (2000) and Vogelsang (2003).”
- Search engine competition with network externalities (2012, unknown): “The issue of access pricing is notoriously involved (see Armstrong (2002) or Vogelsang (2003) for introductory surveys) but it is parts and parcel of regulatory practice.”
- How regulation affects network and service quality in related markets (2012, background): “The same holds for airlines whose investment incentives are at least 1For an overview also see Vogelsang (2003), Guthrie (2006) and the contributions in Dewenter & Haucap (2006).”
- Unbundling the Incumbent: Evidence from UK Broadband (2014, unknown): “Finally, areas receiving LLU are characterized by a greater proportion of people working in high-skill sectors, and by a larger proportion of the population being of a working age (16-60).”
- Privatising Network Industries (2004, unknown): “collusive pricing, even at above profit-maximising levels (Armstrong, 1996, 1998; Laffont Rey and Tirole (1998a, b; Vogelsang, 2003).”
- Regulation and Investment in Network Industries: Evidence from European Telecoms (2012, background): “To analyze the effect of regulation on investment, we consider a situation of one incumbent, several entrants, and a regulator.”