Monitoring, Motivation and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment
By Dan Nagin, James B. Rebitzer, Seth G. Sanders, Lowell J. Taylor. 2002
218 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4c74741ddab1e1849f9c47bf54d89ad115974e6a
How researchers see this paper
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In Economics and Econometrics
- J. Harrigan
- H. Roelfsema
- Robert Dur
- Donald R. Davis
- Nina Pavcnik
- E. Helpman
- Stephen J. Redding
- Ariell Reshef
In Safety Research
Citations in the corpus
- Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, and Trade Liberalization (2007, background): “There are a number of papers, including Groshen and Krueger (1990), Rebitzer (1995), and Nagin et al. (2002) that use exogenous variation in monitoring intensity to confirm that effort does indeed increase in monitoring intensity.(2) There is also a literature that documents industry wage differenti”
- Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations (2007, background): “…contract (see e.g. Settoon et al. 1996, Wayne et al. 1997, Uhl-Bien and Maslyn 2003, Dabos and Rousseau 2004, and Shanock and Eisenberger 2006).2 Nagin et al. (2002) study cheating in call centers and nd that employees who feel that they are treated well by their employer cheat less and are…”
- GDP management to meet or beat growth targets (2018, unknown): “While setting such clear targets helps improve economic performance (Boyne and Chen, 2007), local officials may fail to fully appreciate that these targets merely represent strategic constructs, and as a result they may act as though the measures are the construct of interest and become “rational ch”