Law and Finance in Transition Economies

By Katharina Pistor, M. Raiser, S. Gelfer. 2000

741 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4b017096ba39f124822aa334cc4385ed2ccabd18

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Citations in the corpus

Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison (2004, positive): “Accordingly, we examine the explanatory power of legal rights that give minority investors leverage over insiders in firms focusing on the so-called anti-director rights index developed by La Porta et al., 1997 and used by Pistor et al., 2000 for the transition countries.”
Why Do Countries Matter so Much for Corporate Governance (2007, methodology): “The clustered standard errors are similar to heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White, 1980) except that the weights are sums over each country (cluster); see Rogers (1993) and Williams (2000) for further details.”
Globalization and Similarities in Corporate Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis (2006, background): “This interpretation is consistent with the findings in transition economies of Pistor et al. [2000] and to those regarding Mexican firms exposed to U.S. capital markets by Siegel [2001].”
On the Welfare Effects and Political Economy of Competition-Enhancing Policies (2004, background): “Leading examples include legal reforms to improve contract enforcement (McMillan, 1997; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999) and corporate governance (Pistor et al., 2000), policies to reduce regulatory barriers to the entry of new firms (Djankov et al.”
Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection (2006, positive): “Weak legal protection can be due either to poor quality of the law or to ineffective enforcement (Pistor et al., 2000).”