Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison

By Alexander Dyck, Luigi Zingales, John G. Matsusaka, Tatiana Nenova, Krish Palepu, Mark Roe, Julio J. Rotemberg, Abbie J. Smith, René M. Stulz, D. Spar. 2004

2,583 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9689545e3ed9649106c8a9708dab01ff60b8ccf0

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Citations in the corpus

Should Business Groups be Dismantled? The Equilibrium Costs of Efficient Internal Capital Markets (2006, positive): “A large empirical literature provides evidence that private benefits of control are larger in poor investor protection countries (Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004).”
Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed Companies (2013, background): “In an agency setting featured by ownership concentration, large insider shareholders take advantage of the benefits of private control and enjoy direct access to information (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Dyck and Zingales 2004 ).”
A review of tax research (2010, neutral): “44 The control premium varies across country and is from negotiated control block sales as computed by Dyck and Zingales (2004).”
Strategic Ownership Structure and the Cost of Debt (2012, positive): “Complementary evidence is provided by the analysis of control premiums (Z ngales 1994;Dyck and Zingales 2004).”
Earnings Quality and International IPO Underpricing (2011, neutral): “Ellul and Pagano (2006) suggest that IPOs in less liquid markets will exhibit larger initial returns.”
The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia (2006, positive): “As Dyck and Zingales (2002, 2004), this paper looks at the impact of coverage on corporate governance.”
Ownership structure, control contestability, and corporate debt maturity (2015, neutral): “However, the main agency problem outside the United States is that between controlling and minority shareholders, called the type II agency problem (see, e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Faccio and Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999).”
Auditors' Governance Functions and Legal Environments: An International Investigation (2007, positive): “this conjecture, a number of recent accounting and finance studies find that firm-level governance substitutes are used in weak legal environment (La Porta et al., 1997; Gomes, 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2002; Klapper and Love, 2004; and Lang et al., 2003, 2004).”
The market reaction to cross-listings: Does the destination market matter? (2009, neutral): “…between the private benefits of home and destination market; measured as the country dummy coefficients in a regression of controlling block premia Dyck and Zingales (2004) Ownership Difference between the ownership concentration of home and destination market; measured as the average% ownership…”