Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection

By Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi. 2006

193 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f2bcfa1ee5ec6ba85c438fbc9ea7aef79528272f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Scott F. Latham
2. Michael R. Braun

In Strategy and Management

1. Scott F. Latham
2. Michael R. Braun

Citations in the corpus

• Managerial Risk, Innovation, and Organizational Decline (2009, background): “Because managerial ownership can lead to excess slack being diverted for personal gain (Burkart & Panunzi, 2006), thus limiting critical resource allocations to the firm, it is necessary to consider their joint effects on innovation spending necessary to stabilize organizational decline.”
• Corporate Governance and Control (2003, unknown): “75 See Maher and Andersson (2000) and Carlin and Mayer (2003) for a discussion of corporate governance responses in firms with different investment horizons.”