The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence

By Michael C. Jensen, Richard S. Ruback. 2002

3,298 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4959890a38d4d884f72a6322cae434fe41e295a4

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Citations in the corpus

Productivity, Restructuring, And The Gains From Takeovers (2013, unknown): “One concern is that model fit for target selection is poor (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).”
From social control to financial economics: the linked ecologies of economics and business in twentieth century America (2009, background): “Financial economists saw the large diversified conglomerates that dominated the American economic landscape as examples of managerial behavior that decreased the market value of firms and were therefore harmful to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen and Ruback 1983).”
Do Insider Trading Laws Work (2000, unknown): “With a sample of 613 acquisitions, the pattern of returns is similar to the one documented in the literature (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Mikkelson and Ruback, 1985; Sanders and Zdanowicz, 1992).”
Performance Configurations over Time: Implications for Growth– and Profit–Oriented Strategies (2009, background): “…through more and less related diversification (Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Montgomery, 1982; Rumelt, 1974) and mergers and acquisitions (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987) also underlines that many forms of expansion have questionable influence on financial performance.”
Corporate governance: measurement and determinant analysis (2007, background): “These problems are particularly severe when managers are entrenched ( Jensen and Ruback, 1983”
What is the Price of Hubris? Using Takeover Battles to Infer Overpayments and Synergies (2003, unknown): “That literature is far too large to survey here—see Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) for a recent survey, or Jensen and Ruback (1983) for a survey of earlier work.”
Foreign direct investment, diversification and firm performance (2003, result): “foreign direct investments, however, resemble the bidder returns reported for takeovers, as summarized by Jensen and Ruback (1983) , where on average bidders’ shareholders do not gain or lose.”
Cross-Ownership, Returns and Voting in Mergers (2008, background): “…negative, or at best slightly positive, while average returns to target-firm shareholders are positive and high, when both companies are publicly traded (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 1988; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001;…”
The impact of country-level corporate governance on research and development (2011, background): “La Porta et al. (1997), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) show that investor protection facilitates the development of financial systems.”
IMPACT OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE ON THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF NIGERIAN FIRMS (2012, background): “However, senses and Meckling (1976) and Jensen and Ruback (1983) argue that managers do not always run the firm to maximize returns to shareholders.”
Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective (2010, unknown): “At the other extreme is the market for corporate control, where investors initiate takeovers and buyouts to bring about fundamental changes (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).”
Shareholder Value Creation in European M&As (2004, unknown): “These estimated cumulative abnormal returns are somewhat lower than the average reported in the literature which ranges between 20% and 30% (Jensen and Ruback, 1983, and Datta et al., 1992) and more in line with more recent studies reported in the previous section, suggesting that returns might…”