Voluntary Disclosure of Precision Information

By John S. Hughes, Suil Pae. 2004

145 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/48e6b23cca83776c681e706db0c57bbad713af7d

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Social Responsibility Report Narratives and Analyst Forecast Accuracy (2017, background): “King et al. (1990) suggest that quantitative versus qualitative disclosures show the precision of managers’ beliefs about the future (also see Hughes and Pae 2004).”
Management Earnings Forecasts: A Review and Framework (2008, unknown): “As noted earlier, Hutton and Stocken (2007) report that the median stock price reaction to good news is larger for firms with a reputation for providing accurate (and frequent) forecasts than for firms without this reputation.”
Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision (2013, background): “Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find forecast precision to increase with board independence, whereas Ajinkya et al.”
Voluntary disclosure of information when firms are uncertain of investor response (2007, unknown): “Dye (1985), Jung and Kwon (1988), Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) and Hughes and Pae (2004) introduce uncertainty about the existence of private information, thereby invalidating assumption (ii).”
A Cross-Disciplinary Exploration of Entrepreneurship Research (2007, background): “The first stream concerns a firm’s information disclosure to existing or potential owners and other stakeholders (Guo, Lev, & Zhou, 2004; Hand, 2005; Hughes & Pae, 2004; Titman & Trueman, 1986), usually in the context of IPOs.”
Earnings Guidance and Market Uncertainty (2009, unknown): “4 For example, Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) develop a model that examines whether managers’ disclosures about risk (related to derivatives transactions) affect their firms’ stock prices while Hughes and Pae (2004) examine managers’ incentives to voluntarily disclose the precision of their inf”