The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory

By J. Hirshleifer. 2001

447 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Poverty and Violent Conflict: A Micro-Level Perspective on the Causes and Duration of Warfare (2009, unknown): “20 Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Grossman (2002), Hirshleifer (2001) , Keen (1998, 2005).”
Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models (2005, background): “Agent i gets a ratioF m1 i / ∑n1 i=1 F m1 i , known as the contest success function (Hirshleifer, 2001; Skaperdas, 1996; Tullock, 1967), and utility Ui = F m1 i∑n1 i=1 F m1 i n1∑ i=1 R1 − b1 Fi a1 .”
Resources and transaction costs: how property rights economics furthers the resource‐based view (2005, background): “One attractive line of research is to apply and develop formal game theory models on contests over insecure (i.e., costly to protect) property rights, and how such contests dissipate value (e.g., Skaperdas, 1994; Hirshleifer, 2001).”
Military expenditure in post-conflict societies (2004, background): “As Hirshleifer (2001) has stressed, one cause of conflict is differences in perceptions between the parties: for example, each may be too optimistic about its own military prospects.”
Oil Rents, Corruption, and State Stability: Evidence from Panel Data Regressions (2011, background): “In particular, if the masses cannot share in on the oil rents via redistribution then violence in form of civil conflict may emerge as the masses struggle to capture direct control over the oil resources (see for instance Hirshleifer, 2001).”
Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth (2005, background): “Scholars such as Skaperdas (1992), Grossman and Kim (1995,1996), Hirshleifer (2001) and Dixit (2004) have examined how stable property rights can emerge in such circumstances.”
Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey (2009, unknown): “Hirshleifer (1995, 2001) studies anarchy as a potentially peaceful Hayekian spontaneous order, but considers the conditions under which anarchy would devolve into chaos or lead 11For a critical review of the studies that weakened the earlier prisoners’ dilemma conclusions see Schofield (1985).”
Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem (2008, unknown): “Animosity and the use of emotions for strategic purposes has been noted by some economists (Schelling [33; Hirshleifer [25] Chapter 10) as a commitment device.”
Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war (2008, background): “Hirshleifer (2001), who pioneered much of the analytic research on conflict, proposed the Machiavelli Theorem, that no profitable opportunity for violence would go unused.”
Economic Shocks and Civil War (2009, background): “Hirshleifer (1995, 2001), Grossman (1991), and Skaperdas (1992) are some early examples.”