Resources and transaction costs: how property rights economics furthers the resource‐based view

By Kirsten Foss, N. J. Foss. 2005

373 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/21cf84a27ef1b02806f83ad1cafc2469dc5b62ce

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Citations in the corpus

The Context of Entrepreneurial Judgment: Organizations, Markets, and Institutions (2019, background): “Drawing on Barzel’s (1997) idea of attributes – that is, the characteristics, functionalities and possible uses of resources (Foss and Foss, 2005) – they argue that resource attributes are results of entrepreneurial search and experimentation.”
Understanding opportunity discovery and sustainable advantage: the role of transaction costs and property rights (2008, neutral): “…1959; Mahoney, 1995; Helfat, 1997; Foss, 2001; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Stieglitz & Heine, 2007) and transaction costs to the RBV (e.g., Coff, 1999; Foss & Foss, 2005; Kim and Mahoney, 2006), the specific contribution of this work is to introduce transaction costs and property rights as important…”
Understanding the impact of relational capital and organizational learning on alliance outcomes (2010, background): “According to the resource-based view, the competitive advantage of firms arises from their superior capability in transferring and creating knowledge (Foss & Foss, 2005; Spender, 1996).”
Entrepreneurship, transaction costs, and resource attributes (2006, neutral): “This is the kind of entrepreneurship that was implicitly addressed in Foss and Foss (2005).”
Multinational Enterprises and Local Contexts: The Opportunities and Challenges of Multiple Embeddedness (2011, neutral): “This evidence indicates that while headquarters has ownership rights, the extent to which they translate into enforceable property rights depends the outcome of the bargaining game between the headquarters (as principal) and the subsidiary (as agent) (Foss and Foss, 2005).”
Theories of the Firm-Market Boundary (2011, neutral): “While managers can radically delegate authority and decision rights in an organization, within firm boundaries decision rights are always only “loaned, not owned” (Baker et al., 1999: 56; also see Foss & Foss, 2005).”
Toward a Theory of Public Entrepreneurship (2010, background): “Public entrepreneurship can also be conceived as the creation or definition of property rights in ways that make private and political action more efficient and effective (Barzel, 1989; Foss & Foss, 2005), usually subject to the perception by the political actor that this will confer personal gain.”
Location, collocation and R&D alliances in the European ICT industry (2009, background): “Indeed, contractual and competence arguments are now recognized as connected building blocks for the formulation of a general theory of the firm (Foss, 2003; Foss and Foss, 2005) and, therefore, for the understanding of the determinants of inter-firm partnerships.”
The role of incentives and communication in strategic alliances: an experimental investigation (2009, background): “Property rights theory has much to offer in developing a more systematic approach for understanding strategic alliances (Chi, 1994; Foss and Foss, 2005; Oxley, 1999).”
Who is in charge? A property rights perspective on stakeholder governance (2012, neutral): “Specifically, property rights are conduits upon which economic value of resources can be channeled to high yield uses (Foss and Foss, 2005; Mahoney, 2005).”
Scientific Progress in Strategic Management: The Case of the Resource-Based View (2007, neutral): “Foss and Foss (2005) take an even more micro-oriented approach and focuses not on resources, but on property rights to attributes of resources (e.g., uses and functionalities of individual resources).”
Why knowledge does not equal power: the network redundancy trade-off (2008, background): “…the power at their disposal—and even to commit themselves not to use it—in order to induce cooperative (“win-win”) behavior on the part of their exchange partners (see e.g., Walton and McKersie, 1965; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998; Foss and Foss, 2005; Fernandez-Mateo, 2007).”