Competition in UK Banking: A Report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer

By D. Cruickshank. 2000

220 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

The role of consumers in competition and competition policy (2001, background): “…Return Personal Banking 1330 68% 6% high/excessive 5% above market Motor Insurance 853 51% 53% low/ negative -8.95% Sources: DTI (2000), Cruickshank (2000), Insurance Statistics Yearbook (2000) (Return in banking is Cruickshank's estimate of return on equity; in insurance it is the…”
Decentralized Versus Centralized Financial Systems: Is There a Case for Local Capital Markets? (2005, background): “Recent discussions on the existence of an equity gap for SMEs have in fact been quite intense in both countries (for example, Kramer, 1999; Cruickshank, 2000; Bank of England, 2001, 2003; Lichtblau and Utzig, 2002; Nolte et al., 2002; Paul et al., 2002; KfW, 2003; Rudolph, 2003).”
Spatial Proximity Effects and Regional Equity Gaps in the Venture Capital Market: Evidence from Germany and the United Kingdom (2005, background): “…been closely bound up with a recurring debate over finance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that goes back to the Macmillan enquiry in the 1930s, and which resurfaced in the 1950s and 1970s, and again more recently (Bank of England, 2001; Cruickshank, 2000; HM Treasury, 2003a; 2003b).”
Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature (2003, background): “See Evans and Schmalensee (1999) for a history of U.S. antitrust cases and Chakravorti and Shah (2003) for a discussion of two recent antitrust challenges against MasterCard and Visa.”
Inferior Products and Profitable Deception (2017, methodology): “Based on existing evidence (Cruickshank, 2000; Bucks and Pence, 2008; Gerardi et al., 2009; Woodward and Hall, 2012; Gurun et al., forthcoming) it is plausible to assume that consumers have a limited understanding of mortgages in general, and of these mortgages in particular.”
Levels of efficiency in UK retail banks: a DEA window analysis (2003, background): “…the past two decades have resulted in the ‘clearing banks losing a substantial proportion of their domestic business to essentially non-bank competition’, Cruikshank (2000) and the Competition Commission (2002) both express concerns as to the lack of competition in certain retail banking markets.”
Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK Companies (2005, unknown): “14 According to Cruickshank (2000) these three banks account for 67% of all U.K. commercial lending to the small to medium size corporate sector.”
Empowerment of Whom and for What? Financial Literacy Education and the New Regulation of Consumer Financial Services (2007, unknown): “…vulnerability to mis-selling becomes a matter of consumer imprudence, a risk that is most effectively controlled by consumers acquiring “the basic knowledge and confidence to ask the right questions and to seek out the best products or the ones which suit them best” (Cruickshank 2000: 4.127).”
Corporate social responsibility and structural change in financial services (2004, background): “Notably, the UK financial services industry has faced criticism over a number of issues relating to the management and delivery of its products and services such as the mis-selling of pensions, closure of bank branches and the findings of an official review of retail banking that were published in ”
What do we know about entrepreneurial finance and its relationship with growth? (2015, background): “More recently, reports have drawn attention to the following: the lack of competition in the supply of banking services to SMEs (Cruickshank, 2000; Independent Commission on Banking, 2011), shortcomings in the provision of growth capital (Rowlands, 2009), the need to promote the supply of non-bank s”
An Empirical Analysis of Payment Card Usage (2007, unknown): “recent report to the Treasury in the UK (see Cruikshank [2000] ) that promotes government intervention into the setting of interchange fees because interchange fees do not reflect costs.”
The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems (2003, background): “Hence, for such transactions, interchange fees would be neutral; despite regulatory concerns that high interchange fees might be stifling ecommerce (see Cruickshank, 2000).”
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2019, background): “In the banking sector, Woodward and Hall (2012) finds that borrowers underestimate broker compensation, and Cruickshank (2000) documents that retail bank customers do not know specific banking fees.”
Banks as Continuous Reinvention (2007, background): “In his review for the UK Treasury, published in 2000, Don Cruickshank (former Chair of the London Stock Exchange) found that British retail customers were statistically more likely to divorce than to switch current accounts and 59 per cent of all current account holders were still using their first ”
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Payment Networks (2006, background): “The authorities in the European Commission and the United Kingdom have also investigated the business practices of the card associations (see European Commission (2002) and Cruickshank (2000)).”