Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts

By Mara Faccio, Ronald W. Masulis, John J. McConnell. 2006

2,370 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4708ace3ceccbd0f581067f7a895adead6fd33bd

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Citations in the corpus

The impact of government ownership on bank risk (2013, positive): “Faccio et al. (2006) provide evidence consistent with this idea.”
Corporate immunity to the COVID-19 pandemic (2020, positive): “6 Even without direct government ownership of firms, Faccio et al. (2006) find that politically connected firms are signifi-”
Mixing business with politics: Political participation by entrepreneurs in China (2015, background): “…access debt financing, we are able to identify several other channels other countries, see Fisman (2001), Johnsson and Mitton (2003), Faccio (2006), Faccio et al. (2006), Fan et al. (2007), and Claessens et al. (2008). that entrepreneurs in China exploit through political participation, including…”
Founder's political connections, second generation involvement, and family firm performance: Evidence from China (2015, neutral): “Using data from 42 and 35 countries, respectively, Faccio (2006) and Faccio et al. (2006) find political connections are valuable to firms and that politically connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out by”
Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India (2017, background): “Favored firms are more likely to receive credit from state banks (Cole, 2009; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Carvalho, 2010) and corporate bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006), and their valuations are tied to the fortunes of powerful politicians (Fisman, 2001).”
Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness (2013, neutral): “In addition, a cross-country study of Faccio et al. (2006) finds that politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed out when confronting economic”
Politically Connected Private Equity and Employment (2013, neutral): “…by targets of politically connected private equity firms are more likely to be acquired by bigger private equity firms, and are more likely to be targets of management buyouts and/or going private transactions compared to establishments operated by targets of non-connected private equity firms.”
The Cost of Political Connections (2018, positive): “Findings by Fisman (2001); Johnson and Mitton (2003); Sapienza (2004); and Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2005) suggest that political leaders often use their power to grant economic favors to the firms that are connected to them, which can lead to economic advantages for the connected firms.1 *…”