The impact of government ownership on bank risk

By Giuliano Iannotta, Giacomo Nocera, A. Sironi. 2013

292 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bbda74a50119da77abda7675c3b9086a406398e1

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Citations in the corpus

Ownership Structure and Risk-Taking: Comparative Evidence from Private and State-Controlled Banks in China (2014, background): “…(Fries and Taci, 2005; Bonin et al., 2005), inferior long-term performance (Berger et al., 2005), greater risk taking (Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010; Iannotta et al., 2007, 2013), and less prudent 1 Firth et al. (2009) find evidence that political connections play a role in the accessing of bank…”
Financial Repression in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis (2017, unknown): “The second measure is from Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi (2013), who use Bankscope data to track government ownership of banks from 2000 to 2009.”
Economic uncertainty and bank risk: Evidence from emerging economies (2020, unknown): “It is also generally posited that state-owned banks are likely to be more risky in comparison to their privately owned peers, due to either political interference or implicit government protection (Brandao Marques et al., 2013; Iannotta et al., 2013).”
Rise of the Fiduciary State: A Survey of Sovereign Wealth Fund Research (2014, unknown): “Kalter and Schena (2013) offer an in-depth analysis of emerging market economies needing to balance SWF asset growth, domestic development, and the risks related to recycling SWF assets domestically.”
Corporate social responsibility and bank risk (2019, unknown): “” (Jo and Na (2012)). Firm risk consists of systematic risk (market risk) and unsystematic risk (idiosyncratic risk). Company parameters such as profitability (Wei and Zhang (2006)), ownership structure (Xu and Malkiel (2003)), growth prospects (Cao et al.”
The Invisible Hand of the Government: Moral Suasion during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis (2019, unknown): “…banking deregulation (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999), delay foreclosures on mortgages (Agarwal et al., 2017), and lead to a delay in the release of news about problems in the banking sector (Brown and Dinc, 2005; Imai, 2009; Liu and Ngo, 2014) as well as to higher risk taking (Iannotta et al., 2013).”