Haidt's Moral Intuitionist Theory: A Psychological and Philosophical Critique
By H. D. Saltzstein, T. Kasachkoff. 2004
101 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Information Systems and Management, Social Psychology
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/46b9e7546734edd20c9039fc2833fb99d8b0f4db
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In Cognitive Neuroscience
In Information Systems and Management
In Social Psychology
Citations in the corpus
- Moral psychology for the twenty-first century (2013, background): “For example, Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004) argued that the SIM ‘appears to relegate [moral reasoning] to the status of an epiphenomenon’ and that ‘The one avenue of change that [Haidt] does not seem to recognize is that brought about by reasoned argument.’”
- On dual processing and heuristic approaches to moral cognition (2008, background): “Still, moral reasoning is described as a ‘slave’ to moral intuition (Saltzstein & Kasachkoff, 2004 ) or as a ‘press secretary for a secretive administration—constantly generating the most persuasive arguments it can muster for policies whose true origins and goals are unknown’ (Haidt, 2007 , p.”
- Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up? (2009, background): “Second, it is consistent with this view that the particular value judgments we make in line with our reflective views could become fast and habitual over time, as noted by Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004) .”