Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
By Glenn Ellison. 2000
467 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4410686210418982cb080b63fbfeaf7302d0baf4
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Brian Skyrms
- Matthew O. Jackson
- Alison Watts
- William H. Sandholm
- M. Benaim
- Robin Pemantle
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer
- Benjamin Golub
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Matthew O. Jackson
- Brian Skyrms
- Alison Watts
- Robin Pemantle
- Benjamin Golub
- M. Benaim
- Daisuke Oyama
- Olivier Tercieux
In Sociology and Political Science
- Robin Pemantle
- Daisuke Oyama
- Olivier Tercieux
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer
- Benjamin Golub
- Alison Watts
- Matthew O. Jackson
- M. Benaim
Citations in the corpus
- A dynamic model of social network formation. (2000, methodology): “We now follow the usual method for determining stochastic stability (35).”
- The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure (2003, background): “See Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996), Ely (2002), and Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (2002) for a demonstration of this general point in models somewhat different from those presented here.”
- An evolutionary perspective (2019, unknown): “, 2001), for the speci c parameters con guration giving rise to the distribution speci ed by (13) ; i.”
- On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games (2002, background): “…cost for all of the links that she maintains, then 13 Speed of convergence and its relationship to one-at-a-time trembles is discussed formally in Ellison (2000). the results can change and in particular we can find mixed stochastically stable states where there is play of different strategies…”
- How Homophily Affects the Speed of Learning and Best Response Dynamics (2012, methodology): “, Ellison (2000) and Montanari and Saberi (2008)).”
- The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior (2005, background): “Formally, this state is stochastically stable.16 Using recent results on stochastic stability from Ellison [9], it is easy to show that the former conclusion generalizes to any strictly globally stable ESS.”
- Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games (2003, methodology): “This result is similar to Theorem 1 in Ellison (2000).”
- Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection (2015, methodology): “Using birthdeath chain methods, Sandholm (2001) shows that if a game has a 1k -dominant action 4 that 1This waiting time critique is formalized by Ellison (1993, 2000) and Binmore et al. (1995), among others.”