Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games

By M. Benaim, Jörgen W. Weibull. 2003

333 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/83721abe1e7389c1d207863341ac9406d38ffc0a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. György Szabó
2. Theodore C. Bergstrom
3. Steffen Huck
4. Gábor Fáth

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. György Szabó
2. Theodore C. Bergstrom
3. Gábor Fáth
4. Matjaz Perc
5. Attila Szolnoki
6. Zhen Wang
7. Martin A. Nowak

In Sociology and Political Science

1. György Szabó
2. Theodore C. Bergstrom
3. Steffen Huck
4. Dorothea Kübler
5. Gábor Fáth
6. Matjaz Perc
7. Attila Szolnoki
8. Zhen Wang

Citations in the corpus

• Evolutionary games on graphs (2006, methodology): “(79) This approximation leads to the approximate mean value equation for the strategy frequencies ρi(t) = 〈ni〉/N (Benaim and Weibull, 2003; Helbing, 1996, 1998; Weidlich, 1991): dρi(t) dt = ∑ j [ρj(t)w(j → i; ρ) − ρi(t)w(i → j; ρ)] .”
• Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection Models (2001, positive): “15Michel Benaim and Jörgen Weibull [1] have developed a careful formal treatment of the circumstances in which deterministic approximation of stochastic dynamic evolutionary processes is justified.”
• Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms (2012, background): “work norm.(6) Under the team incentive scheme in our model this is in everybody’s interest.”