Creating Holdup Through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body Revisited*

By R. Freeland. Journal law and economy, 2000

113 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management of Technology and Innovation, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/434db7d19681fe2feb82f3e7548b2a028b428cec

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Robert Gibbons
2. C. Sabel
3. John Paul MacDuffie
4. Roberto Grandinetti
5. Arnaldo Camuffo
6. Andrew A. King
7. Russell W. Coff
8. Richard Makadok

In Management of Technology and Innovation

1. Robert Gibbons
2. C. Sabel

In Strategy and Management

1. Robert Gibbons
2. Susan Helper
3. C. Sabel
4. John Paul MacDuffie
5. Arnaldo Camuffo
6. Roberto Grandinetti
7. Geoffrey M. Hodgson
8. Richard N. Langlois

Citations in the corpus

• Four formal(izable) theories of the firm (2005, background): “…if the haggling were accomplished by 2 More detailed investigation of the GM-Fisher case has produced many additional facts, some of which seem counter to the simple story told above; see Coase (2000), Freeland (2000), Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber (2000), and Helper, MacDuffie, and Sabel (2000).”
• Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While Controlling Opportunism (2000, background): “Indeed, the pricing agreement was revised in 1924, to require that Fisher’s prices be set in the same manner as at GM’s wholly owned divisions (Chandler and Salisbury, 1971, p. 576; Freeland, 2000).”
• Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis (2002, unknown): “did not disappear after integration (Freeland 2000).”