What Determines the Implementation of Imf-Supported Programs?

By Anna Ivanova, W. Mayer, Alex Mourmouras, George C. Anayiotos. Social Science Research Network, 2003

125 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper assesses the implementation of IMF-supported programs using measures of program interruptions, compliance with conditionally, and the share of committed funds disbursed. The econometric model allows an evaluation of the importance for program implementation of political conditions in borrowing countries, IMF effort, conditionally, as well as initial and external conditions. The paper concludes that program implementation depends primarily on borrowing countries` domestic political economy. Strong special interests, political instability, inefficient bureaucracies, lack of political cohesion, and ethno-linguistic divisions weaken program implementation. IMF effort, the extent and structure of conditionally, and initial and external conditions do not materially influence program prospects.

Subfields: Development, Information Systems, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4125b0f0f4a95fdf5ccb88e87f426fbc4c258d54

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Citations in the corpus

Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions (2007, methodology): “Ivanova et al. (2005) used them to measure the extent of conditionality. The IMF (2001) also has used similar data in empirical analyses. Our data on the number of IMF conditions are from a report by Dreher and Vaubel (2004a), who analyzed 206 IMF letters of intent from 38 countries, between April 1”
Foreign Aid and Market-Liberalizing Reform (2005, unknown): “…primarily by domestic political economy considerations, and that conditionality is likely to be effective only in the early stages of reform, when it can bolster the position of reform advocates in government (World Bank, 2004; Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren, 2001: ch. 1; Ivanova et al., 2003).”
The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence (2008, background): “Dreher (2004), Dreher and Vaubel (2004b), and Ivanova et al. (2003) investigate the number of conditions the IMF imposes, while Stone (2008) analyzes the breadth of conditionality.”
THE IMF: A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF ITS ROLE AND OPERATIONS (2007, unknown): “More recent evidence reported by Mussa and Savastono (1999) and by Ivanova et al (2003) confirms that many programmes may not be fully implemented.”
WHICH VARIABLES EXPLAIN DECISIONS ON IMF CREDIT? AN EXTREME BOUNDS ANALYSIS (2005, unknown): “Likewise, Ivanova et al. (2003) conclude in their study of success and failure of IMF-”