What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preferences

By Kenneth F. Scheve, Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001

742 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation (2002, methodology): “…of 36 I have tried variants of the basic class model for the recent periods that include measures of the skill level of the workforce in each state assuming, in line with Midford (1993) and Scheve and Slaughter (1998, 2000), that skilled workers, viewed as a separate class, oppose protection.”
Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest? (2017, background): “Citrin and Green 1990; Chong, Citrin, and Conley 2001; Sears and Funk 1991, 59.”
The Economic Origins of Authoritarian Values: Evidence From Local Trade Shocks in the United Kingdom (2021, positive): “Long-run economic change, especially if concentrated in geographic communities, also may affect political behavior through its impact on local property values (Adler & Ansell, 2019; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001).”
Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation (2005, neutral): “In this context, our result is consistent with the results of econometric studies (using micro-level survey data) on individual level trade policy preferences such as Balistreri (1997), Beaulieu (2001), and Scheve and Slaughter (1998).”
The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence (2001, background): “This brings us to the advantages and disadvantages of our data set compared to the data used by other authors, and in particular those used by Scheve and Slaughter (2001). The big disadvantage is that we do not have data on the sector in which respondents are employed; thus, we cannot directly confr”
Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash (2019, positive): “While this person enjoys income gains from freer trade, the local contractionary effects of trade reduces her asset holdings by lowering housing demand and thus housing values (Scheve and Slaughter 2001).”
Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund (2006, background): “…and Magee 2000; and Beaulieu 2002; and control for Ricardo-Viner effects in our regressions+ 36+ Wood 1994+ 37+ See Haskel and Slaughter 2000; and Baldwin and Magee 2000+ 38+ See Scheve and Slaughter 2001; O’Rourke 2003; and Mayda and Rodrik 2005+ 376 International Organization and take…”
Factor or Industry Cleavages in Trade Policy? An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (2002, background): “101 4The dependent variable in Scheve and Slaughter (2001) is favoring or opposing protectionism based on opinions from the following question in the 1992 NES survey: ‘‘Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs.”