Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation

By Michael J. Hiscox. American Political Science Review, 2002

190 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Globalization and Its (Dis-)Content: Trade Shocks and Voting Behavior (2015, unknown): “However, it precisely defines the identifying assumptions under which we can estimate the average causal mediation effect (ACME) of an observed mediating channel (Imai et al. (2010), Heckman and Pinto (2015)), as well as allowing us to undertake a sensitivity analysis that maps violations of the ide”
Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization (2017, background): “I then discuss how this finding contradicts two dominant existing theoretical frameworks in the literature, which focus on conflicts of interest across factor owners or industries (e.g., Hiscox 2002; Rogowski 1987).”
Winners and Losers in International Trade: The Effects on US Presidential Voting (2017, background): “To empirically investigate this possibility, we need to identify employment in tradable services.”
The Distributional Consequences of Preferential Trade Liberalization: Firm-Level Evidence (2017, unknown): “Frieden 1991; Hiscox 2002; Rogowski 1987.”
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. FOREIGN AID: AMERICAN LEGISLATORS AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF AID (2009, background): “Studies of other foreign policies, like trade, immigration, and sanctions, have identified the supporters and opponents of these policies in much detail (e.g. Hiscox, 2002; Martin, 1992; Rogowski, 1989; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001b).”