Influence Activities and Favoritism in Subjective Performance Evaluation: Evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises

By F. Du, Guliang Tang, S. Young. 2012

167 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Public Administration, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3f46215417fdead26cabee3c145fbe18865e0a26

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. T. Wong
2. F. Zhan
3. Lars Helge Haß
4. Monika Tarsalewska
5. Omrane Guedhami
6. Xing-qiang Du
7. Jeffrey A. Pittman
8. Peter D. Wysocki

In Public Administration

1. T. Wong

In Strategy and Management

1. T. Wong
2. F. Zhan
3. Lars Helge Haß
4. Monika Tarsalewska

Citations in the corpus

• Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China (2015, background): “Furthermore, performance evaluations, salary increases, and career advancement in SOEs often depend on political connections and the rank of the SOE (Du et al., 2012; Hass et al., 2014).”
• Corporate Governance Research on Listed Firms in China: Institutions, Governance and Accountability (2016, methodology): “With the exception of Fan et al. [2007], who examine the political connections of the CEOs and directors in the listed firms, all the other prior research discussed in Section 3 does not examine any possible channels through which the state ownership lowers the accounting and stock return performanc”