Discrete Choice with Social Interactions

By William A. Brock. 2001

1,737 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3f24c704b5fce0090fda0b42d3f310684b57da6a

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Citations in the corpus

Inﬂuentials, Networks, and Public Opinion Formation (background): “Following an extensive literature that encompasses sociology (Granovetter 1978), economics (Blume and Durlauf 2003; Brock and Durlauf 2001; Durlauf 2001; Schelling 1973; Young 1996), social psychology (Latane´ and L’Herrou 1996), political science (Kuran 1991), marketing (Goldenberg, Libai, and…”
Transfers in Cash and in Kind: Theory Meets the Data (2008, neutral): “However, as Manski (2000), Brock and Durlauf (2001), Moffitt (2001) and others have highlighted, these correlations could reflect several different things: an endogenous effect in which the propensity of an individual to behave in a particular way was causally influenced by the behavior of other…”
Activity Spaces, Biographies, Social Networks and their Welfare Gains and Externalities: Some Hypotheses and Empirical Results (2005, background): “See Brock and Durlauf (2001) or Durlauf and CohenCole (2004) for the difficulties of model estimation, when social structure is endogenous to the issue at hand.”
Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Identification in Models of Oligopoly Entry (2006, positive): “This is usually done in “social interactions” models as in Brock and Durlauf (2001). However, in industrial organization, it is more common to have a cross section of markets or games where each data “point” represents an observable outcome of a game.”
A Multinomial-Choice Model of Neighborhood Effects (2002, methodology): “As originally recognized in Manski (1993) and further analyzed in Robert Moffitt (2001) and Brock and Durlauf (2001b), there are possible identification problems in neighborhood models due to the relationship between contextual effects ( )n iY and the equilibrium expected neighborhood choice shares…”
Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player? (2012, background): “The equilibrium outcome vector y in (12) is given by the reduced form equation y =M(x + · ) +M2 (14)”
Regular Article (2004, positive): “Most studies on the statistical modeling of social influence processes have focused on static (Manski, 1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2001) or panel data (Snijders, 2001; Christakis and Fowler, 2007; Steglich et al.”
Identification of Social Interactions (2011, result): “Brock and Durlauf (2006) additionally provide analogous results for general density functions for eil. As in the binary choice case the results are less precise. This theorem and its generalization in Brock and Durlauf (2006) explain various simulation results in Bayer and Timmins (2005).”
Cowards and Heroes: Group Loyalty in the American Civil War (2003, background): “However, because of the nonlinearity of our estimation equation (3), this endogenous interaction can be estimated off of the functional form [Manski 1993, 2000; Brock and Durlauf 2001].”
Heterogeneous Agent Models in Economics and Finance, In: Handbook of Computational Economics II: Agent-Based Computational Economics, edited by Leigh Tesfatsion and Ken Judd, Elsevier, Amsterdam 2006, pp.1109-1186 (2005, methodology): “In this section we discuss work on local interactions by Kirman (1991,1993) and work on social interactions by Brock and Durlauf (2001ab)4.”
Network Effects and Social Inequality (2012, background): “Finally, f ( ) can be a linear, logarithmic, or exponential function relating the total number of all or observed adopters in an individual’s network to the individual’s reservation price.6 (See Brock & Durlauf 2001 for a similar formulation.)”