Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Identification in Models of Oligopoly Entry

By Steven T. Berry, Elie Tamer. 2006

164 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ec37f02e6e5bc81c28157eba673fed0dfaff3a7b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Steven N. Durlauf
2. Andrés Aradillas-López
3. Elie Tamer
4. Á. D. Paula
5. William A. Brock
6. Yannis M. Ioannides
7. Federico Giuseppe Ciliberto
8. L. Blume

In Marketing

1. Elie Tamer
2. Steven N. Durlauf
3. William A. Brock
4. Yannis M. Ioannides
5. L. Blume
6. Federico Giuseppe Ciliberto
7. Andrés Aradillas-López
8. Á. D. Paula

In Strategy and Management

1. Andrés Aradillas-López
2. Federico Giuseppe Ciliberto
3. Yannis M. Ioannides
4. L. Blume
5. Steven N. Durlauf
6. William A. Brock
7. Elie Tamer

Citations in the corpus

• Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report (2010, unknown): “(Berry and Tamer, 2006), but one can argue that they haven’t necessarily taken us much closer to understanding the original question of interest.”
• Identification of Social Interactions (2011, methodology): “…implementable choice structure is implemented by assuming the difference between the payoffs for the two choices is additive in 43See Berry and Tamer (2006) for an overview, and Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2008) and Galichon and Henry (2008) for recent advances in partial…”
• A NOTE ON SEMIPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF FINITE MIXTURES OF DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS WITH APPLICATION TO GAME THEORETIC MODELS (2011, unknown): “As noted by Berry and Tamer (2006), the multiplicity of equilibrium can cause di¢ culties for both the identi cation and estimation of these models.”
• Set Identification in Models with Multiple Equilibria (2011, unknown): “Following Jovanovic, 1989 and Berry and Tamer, 2006 (See for instance the formulation (2.20) page 66 of Berry and Tamer, 2006), we define an equilibrium selection mechanism as a conditional distribution πY | ,X over equilibrium outcomes Y in the regions of multiplicity.”
• Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline Markets (2009, methodology): “For more on inference with mixed strategies, see Berry and Tamer (2006).”
• The Identification Power of Equilibrium in Simple Games (2008, methodology): “This type of game is widely used in the empirical literature on (static) entry games with complete information and under Nash equilibrium (See Bjorn and Vuong (1985), Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Berry (1994), Tamer (2003), Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2003), Ciliberto and Tamer (2003), and Bajari, Hong,”