Understanding overconfidence: Theories of intelligence, preferential attention, and distorted self-assessment

By Joyce Ehrlinger, Ainsley Mitchum, Carol S. Dweck. 2016

158 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Abstract Knowing what we don't yet know is critical for learning. Nonetheless, people typically overestimate their prowess—but is this true of everyone? Three studies examined who shows overconfidence and why. Study 1 demonstrated that participants with an entity (fixed) theory of intelligence, those known to avoid negative information, showed significantly more overconfidence than those with more incremental (malleable) theories. In Study 2, participants who were taught an entity theory of intelligence allocated less attention to difficult problems than those taught an incremental theory. Participants in this entity condition also displayed more overconfidence than those in the incremental condition, and this difference in overconfidence was mediated by the observed bias in attention to difficult problems. Finally, in Study 3, directing participants' attention to difficult aspects of the task reduced the overconfidence of those with more entity views of intelligence. Implications for reducing biased self-assessments that can interfere with learning were discussed.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Family Practice, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3d2bf8587867817209667588fe54a11b6938e858

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In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

  1. Kate Talsma
  2. Benjamin Schüz
  3. Kirsi Tirri
  4. Kimberley Norris

In Sociology and Political Science

  1. Benjamin Schüz
  2. Kirsi Tirri

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