Asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to stock returns

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CEO After-Tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance (2014, background): “SIZE proxies for political costs, as larger firms face more scrutiny on CEO pay (Leone et al. 2006).”
Fair Value Accounting and Gains from Asset Securitizations: A Convenient Earnings Management Tool with Compensation Side-Benefits (2010, background): “The ex post settling up problem described in Leone, Wu, and Zimmerman (2006) appears to be at work in the current credit crisis.”
Is CEO Cash Compensation Punished for Poor Firm Performance (2010, unknown): “INTRODUCTION Leone et al. (2006) find that changes in CEO cash compensation are more sensitive to poor firm performance than to good firm performance, interpreting this evidence as consistent with Boards of Directors using discretion to reduce the costs of ex post settling up in CEO pay.”
Implications for GAAP from an Analysis of Positive Research in Accounting (2010, unknown): “35 See Barclay et al. (2005) and Leone et al. (2006).”
Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism (2007, unknown): “Moerman (2006) finds evidence that bid-ask spreads of syndicated loan trading in the secondary market are lower for firms with more conservative reporting.”