High-Speed Rail & Air Transport Competition: Game Engineering as Tool for Cost-Benefit Analysis

By Nicole Adler, Chris Nash, Eric Pels. Social Science Research Network, 2008

242 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper develops a methodology to assess transport infrastructure investments and their effects on a Nash equilibria taking into account competition between multiple privatized transport operator types. The operators, including high-speed rail, hub and spoke legacy airlines and low cost carriers, maximize profit functions via prices, frequency and train/plane sizes, given infrastructure provision and costs and environmental charges. The methodology is subsequently applied to all 27 European Union countries, specifically analyzing four of the prioritized Trans-European Networks. This discussion paper led to an article in Transportation Research B (2010). Volume 44, pages 812-833.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management, Transportation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3c2cf17a8590899ed145f612b7457b88d571eaf2

Citations in the corpus

• Effects of high-speed rail and air transport competition on prices, profits and welfare (2012, unknown): “In general, the access time of air transport is much longer than that of HSR (e.g., Gonzalez-Savignat, 2004; Adler et al., 2010).”
• Effects of high-speed rail and airline cooperation under hub airport capacity constraint (2014, unknown): “See also Adler et al. (2010).”