Why charities announce donations: a positive perspective

By Richard E. Romano, H. Yildirim. 2001

159 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3b9a23a79c5292a12b6133cdfa03e1443884071b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. James Andreoni
2. C. Kumru
3. Lise Vesterlund
4. S. Gaechter
5. Imran Rasul
6. Steffen Huck
7. Martin Sefton
8. J. Potters

In Safety Research

1. C. Kumru
2. Lise Vesterlund
3. James Andreoni
4. S. Gaechter
5. Imran Rasul
6. Steffen Huck
7. Martin Sefton
8. J. Potters

In Sociology and Political Science

1. C. Kumru
2. Lise Vesterlund
3. James Andreoni
4. J. Potters
5. Imran Rasul
6. Martin Sefton
7. Steffen Huck
8. S. Gaechter

Citations in the corpus

• Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications (2006, background): “, Andreoni and Petrie 2004; Soetevent 2005), or because observing others has informational value about the charity (Romano and Yildirim 2001; Vesterlund 2003).”
• After You - Endogenous Sequencing in Voluntary Contribution Games (2005, background): “3 For theoretical examinations of sequential provision of public goods, see for example Andreoni (1998), Bac and Bag (2003), Bag and Roy (2003), Marx and Matthews (2000), Romano and Yildirim (2001), and Vesterlund (2003).”
• Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study (2007, background): “…as inequality aversion, prestige, or status may have similar effects, as these too can cause followers to have upward sloping response functions (Romano and Yildirim 2001).2 While signaling only can influence the ability to lead-by-example when there is asymmetric information, reciprocity may…”
• The Effect of Status on Charitable Giving (2010, result): “The comparative statics of our example are consistent with the general results of Romano and Yildirim (2001).”
• Matched Fundraising: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment (2010, background): “7 Romano and Yildirim (2001) propose a third explanation in which such”
• Leadership giving in charitable fund-raising (2006, background): “Romano and Yildirim (2001) assume that preferences exhibit a social effect such as a “snob appeal” that makes contributions of one person increasing in the contributions of another.”