Prudential regulation of banks
By J. Black. 2013
262 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/39b18cfcc51a038d93b93205025b6cd6e4ae15ff
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Finance
- Georgios Chortareas
- Alexia Ventouri
- Claudia Girardone
- Fotios Pasiouras
- N. Saini
- Monica Singhania
- P. Geraats
- Rima Turk Ariss
Citations in the corpus
- Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking (2013, unknown): “Also related is the work on banking regulation by Dewatripont and Tirole (1994); Boot and Thakor (1993); and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) among the others.”
- Bank supervision, regulation, and efficiency: evidence from the European Union (2012, background): “Theoretical studies have emphasised the relative importance of capital adequacy requirements in bank regulation (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993).”
- Capital Regulation in a Macroeconomic Model with Three Layers of Default (2014, unknown): “An alternative explanation, closer to our CSV framework, is provided by Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), who interpret bank supervision and deposit insurance as part of a social contract whereby small and unsophisticated savers delegate to bank authorities the disciplining role that creditors typicall”
- Financial Accounting in the Banking Industry: A Review of the Empirical Literature (2014, unknown): “The representation hypothesis put forth by Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) argues that a need to protect small depositors from moral”
- Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There is Rent-Seeking and Risk-Shifting (2015, unknown): “Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) consider optimal regulation of bank capital structure in a model in which too much debt can lead to excessive creditor intervention, whereas too much equity can lead to managerial shirking.”
- The governance, risk-taking, and performance of Islamic banks (2016, unknown): “However, due to the higher level of information asymmetry in banks, dispersed and unsophisticated debt holders cannot prevent the shareholders from excessive risk taking by initiating complete debt contracts on an ex-ante basis (Dewatripon and Tirole 1994).”