Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking

By Sumit Agarwal, David O. Lucca, Amit Seru, Francesco Trebbi. 2013

461 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7e364befb3fa1df321f8bf46643760f132234db0

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Citations in the corpus

The Impact of Supervision on Bank Performance (2020, background): “The paper is similar in this spirit to recent work that examines state versus federal banking supervisors including Agarwal et al. (2014), which finds persistent differences between state and federal banking supervisors in the rating of commercial banks, and Rezende (2011), which finds that banks sw”
The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation (2014, unknown): “…connected to a vast literature in both political economy and banking on the role of regulation and its potential distortions (for examples, specific to banking: Kroszner and Strahan 1999, Berger and Hannan 1998, Barth et al. 2004; Agarwal et al. 2014, and more in general: Besley and Coate 2003).”
Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks (2018, unknown): “2016, Agarwal et al. 2015 and 2017). Like Agarwal et. al. (2014), Lucca et. al. (2014), Granja et al. (2014), Piskorski et al (2015), Fligstein and Roehrkasse (2016), we study lawsuits arising out of the financial crisis and capital constraints.”
A Banking Union for the Euro Area (2013, unknown): “It could be less subject to capture by local interests (if not to broader ones); e.g., Agarwal et al (2012) show that, in the United States, federal regulators are significantly less lenient than state regulators (although the United States also has federal backstops in place).”
Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from RMBS Market (2013, unknown): “Our findings resonate well with studies that suggest that the existing regulatory framework may have also been insufficient in preventing such behavior by various actors in the supply chain of credit (see Keys et al. 2009; Keys et al. forthcoming, and Agarwal et al. 2012).”
Household Debt: Facts, Puzzles, Theories, and Policies (2015, background): “Unfortunately economists have brought little evidence to bear on these debates; again, this market has received scant researcher attention relative to its economic importance.15 A common thread through mortgage, vehicle, and student loan markets is the tight bundling of debt and a durable purchase…”
Where the Risks Lie: A Survey on Systemic Risk (2017, unknown): “In addition to the EBA, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority (EIOPA) were established in 2011 to deal with (31)See for instance Agarwal et al. (2014) for recent evidence.”
Credit-Induced Boom and Bust (2017, unknown): “study by Agarwal et al. (2012). The authors show that federal regulators are significantly less lenient, downgrading supervisory ratings about twice as frequently as state supervisors. Moreover, under federal regulators, banks report higher nonperforming loans, more delinquent loans, higher regulato”
The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009: Why Did It Happen and What Did We Learn? (2015, unknown): “Moreover, state and federal regulators implement similar regulations in different ways (see Agarwal et al. 2014), adding to complexity in the implementation of 5 See Agarwal et al. (2012).”
Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market: Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries (2015, unknown): “In particular, we employ the state regulator leniency index of Agarwal et al. (2014).”