Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There is Rent-Seeking and Risk-Shifting

By V. Acharya, Hamid Mehran, Anjan V. Thakor. 2015

132 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6e8f73db54a8fac78b678c5b7b69e3dc218e579a

Citations in the corpus

• Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive (2013, unknown): “From this perspective, the assessment cited by Acharya et al. (2010), which may well be a realistic description of how bankers would make this particular decision, appears as an instance of managers attempting to take on excessive risk at the expense of incumbent financiers, or of the taxpayers,…”
• Stress tests and small business lending (2018, unknown): “(2010); Petrella and Resti (2013); Candelon and Sy (2015); Bird et al. (2015); and Fernandes, Igan and Pinheiro (2015). 8 Our data for 2012 are taken from the Fed’s CCAR disclosure, but we use the series of results which do not include the bank’s capital plan.”
• Deposits and Bank Capital Structure (2015, unknown): “Much of the recent literature on bank capital structure has been concerned with issues of regulation (e.g., Hellmann et al. (2000), Van den Heuvel (2008), Admati et al. (2010), Acharya et al. (2012)).”
• How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises (2013, unknown): “…moral hazard theories argue that capital attenuates the excessive risktaking incentives induced by limited liability and government protection, and that banks with more capital optimally choose less risky portfolios (e.g., Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Acharya, Mehran, and Thakor, 2011).”
• Dividends and Bank Capital in the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 (2011, unknown): “Acharya, Mehran, and Thakor (2010) suggest creating a capital account by diverting dividends during good times which are then transferred to a regulator when the bank goes bankrupt.”