The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment

By Erling Moxnes, Eline van der Heijden. 2000

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Leaders as role models and ‘belief managers’ in social dilemmas (2018, result): “There is a downward trend in both variables, which is expected given previous results – see Neugebauer et al. (2009), Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), Bayer et al.”
Cooperation in primates and humans : mechanisms and evolution (2006, background): “Cooperation is even fragile if there is a leader who first decides on the contribution to the public good (e.g. Moxnes & van der Heijden 2003, Gächter & Renner 2004, Güth et al. 2004).”
Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments (2007, background): “Over all four treatments, 20 (27) out of 56 groups appointed a leader for periods 17-20 (21-24).”
Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study (2007, background): “In an environment where there is uncertainty about the quality of a public good Potters et al. (2005) find that contributions to the public good are larger when players move sequentially. While this result matches the signaling prediction, it is also consistent with alternative explanations. In part”