Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment: Reply

By Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, John A. List, David H. Reiley. 2005

195 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3851cb04dedf7e3c5ce30fd26dce703278dfab0f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Jacob K. Goeree
2. Karen L. Palmer
3. Thomas R. Palfrey

In Marketing

1. Jacob K. Goeree

In Safety Research

1. Jacob K. Goeree
2. Thomas R. Palfrey
3. Charles A. Holt

Citations in the corpus

• Auction Design for Selling CO 2 Emission Allowances Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (2007, background): “The incentive to shade bids in multi-unit, uniform-price auctions, known as demand reduction, must be weighed against the superior price discovery properties (Ausubel and Cramton 1998; List and Lucking-Reiley 2000).”
• Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (2014, unknown): “Similarly, List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) find demand reduction in and two bidders.”
• GEORGIA IRRIGATION REDUCTION AUCTION (2004, unknown): “3 List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) and Kagel and Levine (2001) document such demand withholding”